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This paper argues that the perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and trade may 
signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less consequential for political parties 
and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan detect in their classic article. We 
present evidence suggesting that 1) party systems are determined in episodic breaks from the past; 2) 
political parties are programmatically inflexible; and, 3) as a consequence, party system change comes in 
the form of rising parties. 
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Have the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis congealed a distinctive structure of conflict in 
Europe?1 In this paper we use the building blocks of a cleavage theory of party competition to 
argue that Europe has been transformed by a new divide. Cleavage theory claims that the 
issues that divide voters are connected in durable dimensions, that political parties make 
programmatic commitments on these issue dimensions, and that as a result of issue coherence 
and programmatic stickiness, change in party systems is a punctuated process that arises from 
shocks external to the party system.  
Summarizing an extensive literature over the past decade, we describe the emergence 
of a transnational cleavage, which has as its core a political reaction against European 
                                                          
1 We would like to thank David Attewell for research assistance. Earlier drafts were presented at a 
workshop, Theory Meets Crisis, organized by the authors at the Schuman Centre, European University 
Institute, 30 June–1 July, 2016, at the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, 1–3 
September 2016, at a conference, ‘Stein Rokkan’s Heritage to Contemporary Political Science: 
Understanding Representational and Policy-Making Challenges in Multi-Jurisdictional Polities,’ University 
of Bergen, 20–21 September 2016, the 26th PhD Summer School of the ECPR Standing Group on Political 
Parties at the University of Nottingham, 23 September 2016, and the Comparative Working Group at 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 18 October 2016. We thank participants at these events, and 
especially Jan Rovny and Frank Schimmelfennig, for comments and suggestions. This research was co-
funded by the EUENGAGE HORIZON grant #649281 and by the Center for European Studies at the 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. We also thank the Robert Schuman Centre, European 
University Institute, for hosting us as Fellows in June–July 2016 and for financing and hosting the 
conference ‘Theory Meets Crisis’ in June 2016, where a first draft of this paper was presented.  
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integration and immigration. The perforation of national states by immigration, integration, and 
trade may signify a critical juncture in the political development of Europe no less decisive for 
parties and party systems than the previous junctures that Lipset and Rokkan (1967) detect in 
their classic article. For challenging parties on the radical right these issues relate to the defense 
of national community against transnational shocks. The European Union (EU) is itself such a 
shock because it introduces rule by those who are regarded as foreigners, diminishes the 
authority exercised by national states over their own populations, produces economic 
insecurity among those who lack mobile assets, and facilitates immigration. Immigration is 
perceived as a particular threat by those who resent cultural intermixing and the erosion of 
national values, by those who must compete with immigrants for housing and jobs, and, more 
generally, by those who seek cultural or economic shelter in the rights of citizenship.  
We term this cleavage a transnational cleavage because it has as its focal point the 
defense of national political, social, and economic ways of life against external actors who 
penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods, or exerting rule. This conception has much 
in common with prior conceptions, but because we wish to outline its character, sources, and 
consequences in ways with which other scholars might disagree, we adopt a distinctive label. 
The emergence of a new cleavage reveals the causal power of social forces in the face of 
established institutions. Perhaps the most stunning consequences of the crises are the 
breakthrough of a radical right party in a country, Germany, that was perceived to be practically 
immune, and the rejection of EU membership in a UK referendum. On both counts, the crises 
can be considered to have ushered in a new era. However, virtually every country contains its 
own surprises, and were we to follow them we would be lost in fascinating detail.  
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Our focus in this contribution is on the general character of conflicts that have arisen, 
their relation to the existing structure of party competition, and how they have reshaped party 
systems. The crises are critical junctures that reveal, in the open air so to speak, the pressures 
that have built up over the past two decades. They suggest that party systems are subject to 
discontinuities rather than to incremental change, and that the response of a party system to 
exogenous change comes from voters rather than parties. 
In the next section, we explain why we think cleavage theory can help us understand 
what has happened. We have no hesitation in dropping the presumption that political parties 
are expressions of already formed, densely organized, and socially closed groups, while building 
on three fundamental claims of cleavage theory: party systems are determined in episodic 
breaks from the past by exogenous social forces; political parties are programmatically 
inflexible; and, in consequence, party system change comes in the form of rising parties. 
The remainder of this contribution provides evidence that this has indeed happened. 
The following section conceives the rise of a transnational cleavage as a reaction to reforms 
that have weakened national sovereignty, promoted international economic exchange, 
increased immigration, and exacerbated cultural and economic insecurity. We examine the 
effect of the economic and migration crises in raising the salience of Europe and immigration, 
and then show that the modal response of mainstream political parties was to stay put on 
these issues. Voters changed, but mainstream parties did not.  
We then present evidence that competition on European integration and immigration is 
structured on the new cleavage. The TAN pole of this cleavage is staked out by the radical 
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right.2 Radical right parties take more extreme positions on these issues, place more salience on 
them, and exhibit greater internal unity than mainstream parties. By virtue of their 
commitment to GAL values, green parties are located at the alter-pole. Just as the religious 
cleavage and the class cleavage were raised by Catholic and socialist parties on one side of the 
divide, so the transnational cleavage is mobilized by radical right parties at one extreme. As the 
transnational divide has become salient, mainstream parties have been compelled to compete 
on issues that lie far from their programmatic core.   
 
Cleavage theory—then and now 
Cleavage theory, originating in Lipset and Rokkan (1967), conceives a national party system as 
the expression of underlying social conflicts. Revealingly, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) ignore 
strategic interaction among parties in explaining the structure of contestation. Instead, they 
focus on the basic cleavages that undergird party support over the medium or long-term: the 
national revolution that produced a cleavage between the central state and peripheral 
communities and between the central state and a supranational church; and the industrial 
revolution that produced an urban/rural cleavage, and later a worker/employer cleavage. In 
each case, the political parties that were eventually formed were instruments of self-conscious, 
socially closed groups. Conflicts between workers and employers, between those living in 
peripheral communities and central state builders, and between secularists and defenders of 
                                                          
2 TAN refers to the tradition/authority/national pole of a cultural dimension with GAL 
(green/alternative/libertarian) at the opposite pole.  
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the Church were rooted in collective identities, grassroots movements, and hierarchical 
organizations. The solidarity that existed in these groups was much more than an expression of 
the social or occupational location of any set of individuals. It was experiential, the outcome of 
repeated conflict which defined and solidified the composition of in-groups and out-groups 
(Bartolini 2000; Bartolini and Mair 1990; Marks 1989).3   
 Before we go any further, it is worth noting that the existence and subsequent decline 
of social closure are not all or nothing. Social closure was far from complete even in the 
immediate post-World War II decades. Recall that around one in three British manual workers 
voted Liberal or Conservative in the 1950s and 1960s (Stephens 1979: 404). A classic 
investigation of cleavage voting in its golden age finds that, for fifteen advanced democracies, 
occupation explained just 4.9 percent of the variance in party choice in the median country, 
France under the 4th Republic, and religion explained just 8.0 percent in the median country, 
Canada (Rose 1974: 17). Franklin (1992: 386) provides extensive data suggesting that the 
median variance in left voting explained by social structure in fourteen countries declined from 
around 20 percent in the 1960s to around 12 percent in the 1980s. Recent literature explaining 
contemporary radical right or green voting find that around ten percent of the variance is 
associated with education, occupation, rural/urban location, sex, and age (Bornschier and Kriesi 
2012; Dolezal 2010; Norris 2005; Oesch 2008). 
                                                          
3 This has affinities with Marxism. Karl Marx regarded class consciousness as the outcome of collective 
struggle in which individuals would come to see their fate as bound to that of their class. Objective class 
location had to be activated in conflict before one could speak of class as a political category.  
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  Lipset/Rokkan show little interest in the factors that bind individuals into collectivities 
(Bornschier 2009: 2). What matters in their theory is that fundamental divisions in a society give 
rise to durable cleavages that structure party competition. The questions they put under the 
spotlight are: 1) What are the fundamental divisions in a society? 2) Which distinctions among a 
population become the bases for cleavages? 3) How do these cleavages interact to shape voter 
preferences? 4) How are voter preferences expressed in party formation and competition? 5) 
How are cleavages mediated by the rules of the game and by party strategies?  
 In coming to grips with these questions, we draw on cleavage theory to make the 
following moves:  
 The strategic flexibility of a political party on major conflict dimensions is constrained to the 
extent it has a durable constituency of voters, a decentralized decision-making structure, a 
self-selected cadre of activists, a self-replicating leadership, and a distinct programmatic 
reputation (Schumacher et al. 2013). Political parties can be flexible on particular issues, but 
efforts to shift position at the level of a conflict dimension are rare. That is to say, political 
parties are induced to seek local maxima in competing for votes (Laver and Sergenti 2009).4 
In addition to shifting its issue position, a political party may seek to subsume an issue into 
the dominant dimension, blur its response, or ignore the issue (Lacewell 2015; Rovny 2015: 
913). The problem for established parties is that a status quo response is more effective for 
a single issue than for a set of strongly related issues.  
                                                          
4 It is simply not possible, on strictly logical grounds, to identify a vote maximizing strategy for any party 
in a populated two-dimensional space (Laver and Sergenti 2009: 43). 
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 Hence, the source of dynamism in party systems in response to major shifts in voter 
preferences is the growth of new political parties. The basic premises of cleavage theory are 
that exogenous forces shape democratic party systems; that change comes from voters, not 
established parties; that political parties are programmatically inflexible; and that as a 
consequence, the response of a party system to a serious exogenous shock takes the form 
of challenging, rather than reformed, political parties.  
 By the time mass political parties came on the scene, cleavages were already 
institutionalized. Now the sequence is reversed. Competitive party systems exist prior to 
the onset of any new cleavage. Hence, it makes no sense to believe that challenging political 
parties will be rooted in pre-existing, socially closed, groups. The connection between rising 
parties and voters has changed because political parties are now formed alongside a new 
cleavage, rather than decades or centuries after. Political parties are actors, not subjects, in 
the formation of social divisions. 
 Cleavage theory is about the interaction of cleavages rather than the replacement of one 
alignment by another. So instead of conceiving party system change as a process of 
realignment in which a new dimension of conflict comes to supersede a prior dimension, 
cleavage theory asks how the continued existence of one division affects the party-political 
expression of a subsequent one. In party systems that load the dice against new parties, a 
new cleavage can be expected to produce intense frictions within parties. In low-barrier 
multiparty systems, by contrast, a new cleavage can be expected to produce new 




 Lipset/Rokkan were alert to social changes that were corroding class conflict, but they had 
no idea that the containers—national states—were going to be transformed in the decades 
around the turn of the twenty-first century. Territorial identity as a motive for conflict was 
thought to be a thing of the past. Nationalism was viewed as the dead-end result of inter-
war fascism, never to be repeated. Ethnic nationalism within states was considered an inert 
remnant of long-past peripheral resistance to nation building. In the absence of territorial 
identity—perhaps the most powerful source of mass political mobilization—domestic 
conflict was compressed to left/right conflict about who gets what. When the political 
gorilla of nationalism left the room after World War II, domestic debate was narrowed to 
economic issues, i.e., the role of the state, taxes, and welfare spending. Lipset and Rokkan 
(1967: 13) recognized that ‘Functional oppositions can only develop after some initial 
consolidation of the national territory’, but they were unable to see that national territory 
might be deconsolidated in authoritative redesign. 
 
A transnational cleavage 
The institutional point of departure for a post-Lipset/Rokkan cleavage is a series of major 
reforms in the early 1990s that diminished the cost of international trade and migration while 
diffusing authority from central states to bodies within and among them. The Maastricht Treaty 
(1993) extended EU authority over wide ranges of public life, made it much easier for people to 
work in another EU country, created a common currency, and turned nationals into EU citizens. 
The dissolution of the Soviet empire in 1989 released more than one hundred million people to 
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trade and circulate within the EU. The World Trade Organization (1994) was negotiated in the 
early 1990s, as were regional trade organizations, now totaling thirty-five in number (Hooghe et 
al. forthcoming). The 1990s were the cusp of a rapid increase in international trade, 
international migration, and economic inequality that have their ideological roots in the 
Thatcher-Reagan years. However, the consensus on transnationalism encompassed the 
mainstream left as well the mainstream right.  
The intellectual basis for transnationalism is broad and deep. The lower the transaction 
costs of international economic exchange, the greater the scope for specialization and 
economies of scale. A core premise of neoclassical economics is that introducing common 
standards and diminishing barriers to trade and investment increases economic growth. From a 
public goods perspective, national states are both too small and too large. Many of the most 
intractable problems that confront humanity—including global warming, failed states, species 
loss, and environmental degradation—require ongoing co-operation among states and their 
populations. National sovereignty and its political expression, the national veto, are obstacles 
to problem solving, which is why many international organizations pool authority among their 
member states in quasi-majoritarian decision-making. Functional efficiency in the provision of 
public goods calls for multilevel governance, both below and above the central state (Hooghe 
and Marks 2009b; 2015).  
 However, transnationalism proved to be highly contentious, particularly in Europe 
where increased trade and intermingling of peoples went hand in hand with the creation of a 
supranational polity (Hurrelmann et al. 2015: 55–6). European integration raised fundamental 
issues of rule and belonging for those who wished to ‘defend national culture, language, 
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community and national sovereignty against the influx of immigrants, against competing 
sources of identity within the state, and against external pressures from other countries and 
international organizations’ (Marks and Wilson 2000: 455; Prosser 2016: 748–9). Beginning in 
1999, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) tapped the positions of political parties on a GAL 
versus TAN dimension which proved to be strongly associated with support for Europe.     
Transnationalism also has transparent distributional consequences, biasing the gains 
from trade to those who have mobile assets. Losers who feel they are slipping with no prospect 
of upward mobility resent the dilution of the rights and protection of citizenship by a global 
élite that views national states and their laws as constraints to be finessed or arbitraged. As 
Martin Wolf (2016) wrote in the Financial Times: ‘[t]he share of immigrants in populations has 
jumped sharply. It is hard to argue that this has brought large economic, social and cultural 
benefits to the mass of the population. But it has unquestionably benefited those at the top, 
including business’. Resentment can be sharp among those who value national citizenship 
because they have few alternative sources of self-worth. Nationalism has long been the refuge 
of those who are insecure, who sense they are losing status, and who seek standing by 
identifying with the group. The promise of transnationalism has been gains for all, but the 
experience of the past two decades is that it hurts many. Hence, opposition to transnationalism 
is for many a populist reaction against élites who have little sympathy for national borders 




The social basis  
From the late 1990s, several writers began to consider European integration from a cleavage 
perspective.5 Explaining the rise of the vote for the radical right in Switzerland, Kriesi (1998: 
180) pointed to ‘the emergence of yet another new cleavage – the cleavage opposing the new 
middle class winners of the transformation of Western European societies to the group of 
losers of the very same process’. In these years, a flow of publications suggested that conflict 
over Europe cut across the left-right divide, that Europe was part of a larger cultural conflict, 
and that this conflict was socially structured. In a chapter titled, ‘Europe: A New Electoral 
Cleavage?’ Evans (1999: 220) made the case that Europe had ‘the potential to cross-cut and 
restructure partisan divisions in the British electorate’. Marks and Wilson (2000: 433) suggested 
that European integration amounts to a ‘constitutional revolution’, which they analyze from a 
cleavage perspective. Hooghe et al. (2002: 979) went on to argue that ‘nationalism, anti-
immigration, and traditionalism go hand in hand’ and constitute a distinct dimension of conflict 
                                                          
5 Inglehart (1971: 992) detected a post-industrial cleavage in which a young, educated section of the 
middle class would realign on libertarian values and workers would be potential recruits for conservative 
parties. In his early formulation, Inglehart made the connection with internationalism: ‘[t]he libertarian 
position seems linked with internationalism. This follows from the fact that, according to our analysis, 
the post-bourgeois groups have attained security in regard to both the safety and sustenance needs; 
insofar as the nation-state is seen as a bulwark protecting the individual against foreign threats, it is less 
important to post-bourgeois respondents’ (1971: 997).  
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driven by radical right parties. And in his influential book, Bartolini (2005: 395, 404) asserted 
that European integration was a process of fundamental territorial re-articulation that could 
produce a new cleavage ‘rooted in…life chances and material opportunities’ that would ‘cut 
heavily across, reshuffle, and reshape’ national political parties. Kriesi, Grande, and co-authors 
(2006; 2012) have explored how European integration and immigration have structured 
preferences and political conflict in Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and 
Austria by pitting the winners of globalization who favor transnational integration against losers 
who seek demarcation. ‘[T]wo of the most important groups on the winners’ side, highly 
educated people and socio-cultural specialists, are far more supportive of opening borders than 
are those with lower levels of education and those who are unskilled workers’ (Kriesi et al. 
2012: 73).  
At its nationalist pole, this cleavage connects the defense of national culture to national 
sovereignty, opposition to immigration, and trade skepticism. These are reinforcing issues for 
those who feel they have suffered transnationalism—the down and out, the culturally insecure, 
the unskilled, the de-skilled, i.e., those who lack the education needed to compete in a mobile 
world. Education emerges as a powerful structuring factor with a double effect. Education is 
necessary for those who rely on their own talents to live an economically secure life in a world 
with low barriers to trade. Just as importantly, education shapes the way a person looks at the 
world and their fellow humans. Education allows a person to see things from the other side, a 
key to empathy for those who have a different way of life (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Kuhn et 
al. 2016: 38).   
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Education shapes attitudes on trade, immigration, and globalization (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox 2006, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).6 This view gained credibility when political 
economists investigating the economic undergirding of trade attitudes found a powerful and 
unexpected educational effect that could not be reduced to economic interest (Mayda and 
Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002). Individuals with limited education are much more 
likely to have an exclusive national identity which predisposes them to Euroskepticism 
(Polyakova and Fligstein 2016: Table 5; Hakhverdian et al. 2013: 534). Bechtel et al. (2014) show 
how cosmopolitan values drive the positive association between support for Eurocrisis bailouts 
and higher education. Card et al. (2012) conclude that cultural concerns are decisive in 
explaining attitudes to immigration among less educated respondents. Students of immigration 
who had always considered non-economic alongside economic factors find that community, 
identity, and framing are even stronger than originally thought (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Sides 
and Citrin 2007).  
                                                          
6 Access to higher education shapes a person’s life-long attitudes (Triventi 2013: 499). Controlling for 
socioeconomic status and attitudinal variables, Coffé and Voorposte (2010: 442) find that ‘young people 
whose parents vote for the SVP [Swiss People’s Party] are significantly more likely to support the SVP’. 
Longitudinal survey research suggests that attitudes underpinning right-wing extremism are rooted in 
early childhood, persist over a person’s life, and are transmitted inter-generationally. Analyzing nineteen 
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), Avdeenko and Siedler (2015) find that a male whose 
parents express affinity toward a right-wing party is thirteen percent more likely to support a radical 




The Eurocrisis and the migration crisis  
Just as the Bolshevik revolution was a critical juncture in the expression of the class cleavage, so 
the Eurocrisis and the migration crisis can be considered as critical for the emergence of a 
transnational cleavage. These crises have raised the salience of Europe and immigration in 
public debate, intensified divisions within mainstream parties, and have led to an upsurge of 
rejectionist political parties (Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Hobolt and Tilley 2016). At the very 
least, it is ‘tempting’—to adopt a word that Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 47) use in a similar 
context—to say that something fundamental is taking place, namely the generation of a 
distinct, rooted, and durable conflict that will overlay and disrupt the existing structure of party 
competition.   
 The crises themselves provide some clues regarding their larger significance. The first, 
economic, crisis transmuted into a distinctly European crisis when Chancellor Merkel declared 
soon after the Lehman Brothers collapse that every country must act separately to defend its 
financial institutions. Under intense pressure from German public opinion, which was 
vehemently opposed to Eurozone bailouts, Merkel committed her government to preserving 
Article 125 of the Maastricht Treaty, the anti-bailout clause prohibiting shared liabilities or 
financial assistance. Eurozone governments were trapped in a postfunctionalist dilemma. On 
the one side they were impelled by an unrelenting functional logic toward fiscal union. On the 
other they were unnerved by tenacious domestic resistance.  
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The result was a series of incremental reforms that staved off disaster while prolonging 
the agony of austerity. Fearing open debate, parliamentary votes, and popular participation, 
national governments reverted to conventional diplomacy which had the intended effect of 
empowering national executives and, at least temporarily, bypassing EU institutions (Jones et 
al. 2015).7 The European Stability Mechanism was based on a treaty modification which, 
ingeniously, avoided referendums by requiring only a two-line amendment to the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU. Since 2012, the European Central Bank, a technocratic institution 
insulated from popular pressures, has been instrumental in providing much needed liquidity. 
Piecemeal reforms, alongside banking union and upgraded financial surveillance, did just 
enough to save the Eurozone and avert the default of heavily indebted countries. National 
governments have taken the path of least political resistance, keeping the Euro afloat with 
regulatory measures, while avoiding populist pressures that would arise in major treaty reform 
(c.f., Börzel and Risse in this collection).  
The outcome was a North-South rift between creditor and debtor nations (Laffan 2016; 
Tsoukalis 2014). Discursive analysis reveals that this rift has sharp national edges and feeds on 
                                                          
7 In June 2010, these governments set up a limited liability company under Luxembourg law with 
seventeen national shareholders to provide emergency loans to Greece, Ireland, and Portugal. In 
September 2012, they set up an intergovernmental organization, the European Stability Mechanism, 
again in Luxembourg, this time under international law, to provide a financial firewall for distressed 
countries. As Schimmelfennig (2015: 179) notes, ‘asymmetrical interdependence resulted in a burden-
sharing and institutional design that reflected German preferences and its allies predominantly’. 
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simplistic national stereotypes (Mylonas 2012). The net result was to raise the salience of 
European integration in domestic debate, particularly among groups and parties taking extreme 
positions (Hutter et al. 2016; Risse 2014).  
Expert estimates summarized in Figure 1a show that the salience of European 
integration has increased markedly since 2006, from a mean of 4.60 in that year to 5.93 in 
2014, a difference that is highly significant (p=.000). Figure 1a also reveals that salience is 
skewed to Euroskeptic parties, which is what one might expect on an issue that has become 
polarized. Northern imposition of ordo-liberalism and fiscal austerity backed by a system of 
sanctions prolonged the Eurocrisis while it failed to contain the rise of nationalist political 
parties. Ironically, radical right parties gained in the very countries where national interest 
shaped government policy. In the South, by contrast, austerity and currency inflexibility 
produced economic misery and resentment which was mobilized chiefly by the radical left.  
[Figures 1a and b: Salience of European integration and immigration] 
Figure 1b reveals that the salience accorded to immigration is similar to that for 
European integration. Political parties taking extreme positions on immigration tend to 
emphasize the issue more than those taking moderate positions. And, similar to party salience 
on Europe, the U-curve is tilted up for parties that take strong rejectionist positions. Party 
salience on immigration in 2010 (Figure 1b) is considerably higher in Northwestern and 
Southern Europe than in Central/Eastern Europe (6.63, 6.23, and 4.09, respectively, on a zero to 
ten scale). Whereas countries in the Northwest and South were recipients in the flow of 
population within Europe, those in the East were donors. A regional breakdown of the salience 
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data suggests that even before the migration crisis of 2015, immigration was perceived to be a 
major issue in the Northwest and South.        
The party salience question on immigration was asked to experts only in 2010, so we 
cannot assess change. However, mass surveys suggest that the migration crisis, which became 
acute from August 2015, ratcheted up public concern. In Spring 2014, prior to the crisis, 15 
percent of those surveyed by Eurobarometer selected immigration as ‘one of the two most 
important issues facing [our country] at the moment’. In no Eastern country was immigration 
flagged as important by ten percent of the respondents, while nine Northern or Southern 
countries registered double-digit figures. In Spring 2016, the overall figure had increased to 28 
percent, a level of concern second only to unemployment (33 percent) and greater than for the 
economic situation (19 percent), health (16 percent), or terrorism (16 percent). Central and 
Eastern European countries were no longer insulated. Immigration was a top-two issue in all 
Eastern countries except Romania. 
 
Sticky political parties 
Cleavage theory is a theory of discontinuity in the response of party systems to serious 
exogenous shocks. Change comes chiefly in the form of new political parties that challenge 
existing parties on a new cleavage (de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Rovny 2012). The positional 
maneuverability of political parties established on prior cleavages is constrained by self-
selected activists, self-replicating leaders, and embedded reputations. Political parties can be 
considered to be satisficers with ‘their own “bounded rationality” that shapes the way in which 
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[they] come to terms with new challenges and uncertainties’ (Dalton and McAllister 2015; 
Kitschelt et al. 1999; Marks and de Vries 2012; Marks and Wilson 2000: 434). Complex 
organizations, in general, adapt well to gradual change, but are challenged to respond to major 
change in their environment (Aldrich 2007).  
The evidence is in line with this. Political parties in Europe appear to be sticky, as a 
cleavage perspective would lead one to expect. Party systems have responded to concerns 
about European integration and immigration, but this has not happened because political 
parties have shifted position. Figure 2 displays kernel density estimations (KDE) on party 
positioning on European integration for 215 national political parties in twenty-four European 
countries (Bakker et al. 2015). Each curve represents the probability distribution for a change in 
party positioning across two consecutive waves of the CHES survey. Negative numbers on the X-
axis denote a decline in support on a seven-point scale, and positive numbers an increase in 
support.8 The probability distribution is strongly peaked: 90.1 percent of the political parties 
surveyed move less than one point in either direction across consecutive surveys. There is a bit 
more movement across longer time spans, but not much. Just 17.2 percent of the parties shift 
more than one point over three CHES waves, and 20.0 percent shift more than one point over 
four CHES waves. This is consistent with Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s (2016: 145) finding, 
                                                          
8 Kernel density estimation is a non-parametric method in which the data are treated as a randomized 
sample and the distribution is smoothened. We use Stata’s default, the Epanechnikov estimator, which 
selects a smoothing bandwidth of 0.123 for the two-wave kernel function and a bandwidth of 0.171 for 
the three-wave function.  
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based on their expert survey, that parties ‘do not change their integration stance to any great 
degree’.  
[Figure 2: Change in party position on European integration] 
Expert evaluations of party positioning on immigration go back to 2006. Over the period 
2006 to 2014 we detect similar stability (see Table 1). Of 140 parties that we track over the 
period, only three shift more than two points in any one direction on immigration. The average 
absolute change over this period is 0.59 on immigration and 0.55 on European integration, both 
on a seven-point scale.9 Parties tend to switch back and forth over time. The average raw 
change over this eight-year period is just –0.02 points on immigration and +0.05 points on 
European integration.  
[Table 1: Change in party position on immigration and European integration, 2006 to 2014] 
Before we move on, we need to assess the validity of this finding. Party manifestos, in 
general, reveal greater change than expert judgments (Dalton and McAllister 2015: 767ff). 
There are several possible reasons for this. One is that coding of party manifestos at the level of 
an individual issue might produce greater change than expert evaluation at a more general 
dimensional level. This would be the case if political parties were able to maneuver on specific 
issues, but were more constrained on bundles of issues. A second possibility is that experts 
                                                          
9 Positioning on immigration is estimated on an eleven-point scale ranging from ‘strongly opposes tough 
policy on immigration’ (0) to ‘strongly favors tough policy on immigration’ (10). For comparability, we 




think along cleavage lines in ‘recording the longstanding core principled positions of parties’, 
which might lead them to downgrade efforts by parties to shift their positions (McDonald et al. 
2007). This would happen if manifestos record attempts by parties to shape how they are 
perceived, while experts evaluate how political parties are actually perceived. If so, one would 
expect experts to use manifestos as one source among others to estimate party positioning. 
Experts can plausibly be regarded as Bayesians who use party manifestos alongside other 
indicators, such as speeches made by party leaders, to update their judgments.  
One might expect voters to be Bayesians too. Given the time and cognitive constraints 
on their political attention, voters tend to rely on generalized conceptions of party identity 
(Green et al. 2002). These tend to be stable over time. The European Election Survey (EES) asks 
voters to place political parties on European integration, and the results are similar to those 
using CHES data (see appendix).  Dalton and McAllister (2015: 768) find striking consistency 
across time for the left/right positioning of parties, with associations from election to election 
around 0.96. Remarkably, the consistency in party positioning appears to decay little across 
three or even four elections. On this evidence, one must look beyond party positioning to 
explain how party systems respond to exogenous shocks.  
This is a scenario for disruption. If existing parties cannot radically shift their issue 
positions, one would anticipate: 1) sharp tensions within mainstream parties on a new 
dimension, particularly in high barrier systems, and 2) the growth of challenging parties, 
particularly in low barrier systems. The evidence we have is in line with this. Figure 3 reveals 
that serious internal dissent is highest among political parties that take a middling position on 
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European integration in 2014. In response to a new cleavage, moderation does not produce 
consensus. Dissent is lower among parties that take polar positions.  
[Figure 3: Dissent within political parties on European integration] 
Conservative parties may be particularly prone to internal dissent because they combine 
neoliberal support for transnationalism and nationalist defense of sovereignty (Marks and 
Wilson 2000). Four of the six parties with a dissent score higher than 5.5 in 2014 are 
Conservative: the British Conservative Party (dissent = 7.3), Lithuania’s Order and Justice (6.0), 
Italy’s Forza Italia (5.9), and France’s UMP (5.8). Institutional rules play a role here. Britain and 
France, the European democracies with the highest barriers to party entry, have had 
exceptional levels of intra-party dissent in 2014 and over the 1999 to 2014 period as a whole 
(Adam et al. 2017: 11). The British Conservative party has been more deeply riven than any 
other party, and in the wake of the Brexit referendum is more bitterly divided than ever (Hobolt 
2016; Tzelgov 2014).  
 
The rise of parties on the transnational cleavage 
Moderate political parties based in the cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan have declined 
across Europe. On average, the vote share for social democratic, Christian democratic, 
conservative, and liberal parties fell from 75 percent in the first national election after 2000 to 
64 percent in the national election prior to January 2017. With few exceptions, these parties 
have continued to support European integration at a time of increasing skepticism. In 2014, just 
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seven of 112 mainstream parties took a position on the negative side of our European 
integration scale.  
Consensus on Europe among mainstream parties did not matter much when the issue 
was marginal. Mainstream parties sought to de-emphasize the issue to ‘retain the current 
dimensional competition’ (de Vries and Hobolt 2012: 263; Green-Pedersen 2012: 126–7). Prior 
to the Eurocrisis, Peter Mair (2007: 12) could write that the famed European giant described by 
Franklin and van der Eijk (1995) ‘is not only sleeping, but has been deliberately sedated, so that 
Jack—in the shape of the mainstream parties—can run up and down the European beanstalk at 
will’. No longer. The giant has awakened in an era of constraining dissensus when attitudes over 
Europe are expressed in national elections, European elections, and national referendum 
campaigns which escape mainstream party control (Grande and Hutter 2016: 40; Hooghe and 
Marks 2009; Treib 2014).  
In much of Europe the crises have reinforced a new transnational cleavage that has at its 
core a cultural conflict pitting libertarian, universalistic values against the defense of 
nationalism and particularism (Bornschier and Kriesi 2012; Golder 2016: 488; Höglinger 2016). 
Recent literature has spawned a variety of concepts to describe this: demarcation vs. 
integration (Kriesi et al. 2006; 2012); libertarian-universalistic vs. traditionalist-communitarian 
(Bornschier 2010); universalism vs. particularism (Beramendi et al. 2015; Häusermann and 
Kriesi 2015); cosmopolitan vs. communitarian (Teney et al. 2013); and GAL vs. TAN (Hooghe et 
al. 2002).  
Europe and immigration—issues that have risen sharply in salience as a result of the 
crises—are flashpoints in the generation of this cleavage. What matters from a cleavage 
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perspective is how issues that might otherwise be unconnected form a coherent program, how 
political parties gain a reputation around such programs, how those programs are 
differentiated from those of existing parties on prior cleavages, and how parties on a new 
cleavage are polarized in response to those issues.  
Europe and immigration are perceived from diametrically opposing standpoints by TAN 
and GAL political parties. Whereas social democratic, Christian democratic, conservative, and 
liberal parties are similarly positioned on these issues, TAN parties and GAL parties take distinct 
positions that place them at the polar extremes. The coefficient for variation among TAN and 
GAL parties is 0.53 on European integration and 0.96 on immigration. For mainstream parties it 
is 0.19 and 0.38, respectively (CHES 2014).  
Whereas political parties formed on prior cleavages conceive of Europe and immigration 
as weakly linked, TAN and GAL parties conceive them as intimately connected (March and 
Rommerskirchen 2015). The association between the positions that mainstream parties take on 
Europe and immigration is 0.33; for radical right and green parties it is 0.82 (CHES 2014). 
Transnationalism in the form of support for European co-operation and free movement is 
strongly consistent with the social libertarian, cosmopolitan, and universalist values of green 
parties. Equally, but in the opposite camp, rejection of European integration and immigration 
lie at the core of TAN defense of the nation against external forces (Tillman 2013). TAN and GAL 
parties take more extreme positions on Europe and immigration than mainstream political 
parties; they tie these issues into a tightly coherent worldview; they consider them as intrinsic 
to their programs; and, correspondingly, they give these issues great salience. 
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Every country in Europe has been deeply affected by the political fallout of the crises, 
but the way in which party systems have responded varies widely. Cleavage theory suggests 
that this reflects the party-political expression of prior cleavages and the character of the crises 
(Casal Bértoa 2014). Figure 4 reveals some territorial patterns. TAN and GAL parties have grown 
alongside radical left parties in Northern Europe. The ellipse at the center of Figure 4 
encompasses eight countries with a pronounced transnational cleavage, mobilized chiefly by 
the radical right, alongside radical left parties which conceive transnationalism as an extension 
of economic left/right distributional conflict (Brigevich and Edwards 2016; Hobolt and de Vries 
2016: 7; van Elsas et al. 2016). Radical left parties reject European integration on the ground 
that it hurts those who cannot take advantage of transnational mobility, but they retain a 
commitment to working-class internationalism and do not take a strong position against 
immigration. 
[Figure 4: Green, TAN, and radical left vote, 2014] 
In Eastern European countries located within the tall ellipse in Figure 4, the 
predominant response to the crises has been the growth of radical right parties. Radical left 
parties are weak or absent. In these countries, leftist distributional concerns have been 
absorbed by radical right parties in their nationalist/traditionalist agenda. Historically, 
communist rule combined economic left ideology and TAN values, and this generated 
subsequent opposition from right-GAL parties campaigning for market reform, liberal 
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democracy, and EU membership (Vachudova and Hooghe 2009: 188; Coman 2015: 3; Marks et 
al. 2006).10  
The political fallout from the crises came later to Eastern Europe than to other parts of 
Europe. All but Slovenia and Slovakia were outside the Eurozone, and were shielded from the 
bitter distributional conflicts that took place in Southern Europe.11 Moreover, Eastern Europe 
supplied, rather than received, EU migrants (Allen 2015: 8–10; Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; 
Koev 2015; Rovny 2014b). Immigration became a hot issue only from May 2015 following the 
European Commission’s distribution scheme.12  
                                                          
10 This pattern is less pronounced in the communist periphery (the Baltic countries, Croatia, and 
Slovenia), where the communist federation had protected ethnic minorities. As a result, the successor 
parties to the communist parties tend to be more open to multiculturalism and GAL values, while the 
nationalist agenda has been captured by mainstream right-wing parties (Rovny 2014a, 2014b). 
11 Rohrschneider and Whitefield (2016: 142) note that in Central and Eastern Europe ‘party reputations 
are less strongly embedded in the electorate’. Cross-national variation in the ideological space is also 
greater (Rovny and Polk 2016; Savage 2014) and there is a larger role for non-ideological issues 
concerning corruption, good governance, and populism. This has produced political parties combining 
moderate agendas on economic and socio-cultural issues with a radical anti-establishment rhetoric (e.g., 
Res Publica in Estonia, New Era in Latvia, SMER in Slovakia, and TOP09 in the Czech Republic). The 
phenomenon is described as ‘centrist populism’ (Pop-Eleches 2010) and ‘mainstream reformism’ 
(Hanley and Sikk 2016: 523). 
12 In 2010, the salience of immigration for radical right parties in Eastern Europe is 6.56 on a zero to ten 
scale, compared to 9.40 in western Europe.  
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The United Kingdom (UK) is located among the countries of Eastern Europe in Figure 4 
with a radical TAN party and no radical left party. The UK’s plurality electoral system raises the 
barrier to party entry in response to a new cleavage and exacerbates conflict within the major 
parties. The transnational cleavage has been expressed outside the party system in the Brexit 
referendum and by the flash rise of the Independence party. The Conservative party is riven by 
conflict between its nationalist and neoliberal factions, and in the absence of a radical left 
party, the Labour party has shifted to the left. 
Southern European countries have seen the rise of radical left parties in response to the 
crises. Largely as a consequence of austerity, the Eurocrisis reinforced rather than challenged 
economic left-right conflict centered on distribution and welfare. This has sharpened the 
economic case against European integration (Otjes and Katsanidou 2016). Whereas TAN parties 
in the North strive for the ethnic homogeneity of the nation, radical left parties, predominant in 
the South, emphasize civic nationalism and territorial control (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). The 
distributional framing of the Eurocrisis also explains why, in the South, radical right parties have 
so far not been the chief beneficiaries of mainstream disaffection. In Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland, conservative parties have long had a strong TAN inclination (Alonso and Kaltwasser 
2014). The same is true in Slovenia, where experts estimate the mainstream conservative party, 
the Slovenian Democratic party, in 2014 as 8.4 on the ten-point TAN scale. Slovenia, which 
joined the Eurozone in 2007, is the only former communist country where the radical left gains 
more electoral support than the radical right.13 Only in Italy and Greece did radical right parties 
                                                          
13 The United Left was founded in 2014 by a group of activists inspired by Occupy Wall Street. 
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have more than two percent of the vote prior to the crisis (Ignazi 2003). In Italy, radical TAN 
support has remained just above ten percent, while in Greece it increased from 3.7 percent in 
2007 to 10.7 percent in the 2015 national election (Ellinas 2014; Lamprianou and Ellinas 2016). 
However, in both countries, the radical left has won the major share of the discontented vote.  
 
Conclusion 
The experience of the past ten years following the economic crisis and migration crisis leads us 
to reconsider the research program initiated by Lipset and Rokkan. The reasons for the 
rejection of the program from the 1980s are several, and they remain persuasive. Party systems 
have unfrozen as new political parties have risen and old parties have declined. More 
fundamentally, the organizations that tied voters to parties—including churches for 
confessional parties and unions for socialist parties—encompass a smaller share of the 
population and have less influence on those they do encompass. Finally, the life-long attributes 
that structured political preference—chiefly social class and religion—have lost some predictive 
power.   
 However, we believe that these developments do not exhaust cleavage theory. Cleavage 
theory hypothesizes that the response of a political party to a new social division is constrained 
by its location on a prior social division. Just as it was difficult for a party based on religious 
conflict to subsume class conflict, so it is difficult for a political party based on class conflict to 
subsume conflict over transnationalism. Hence, cleavage theory explains party system change 
as a disruptive process rather than an incremental process. Extant political parties are in 
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constant motion as they seek to adapt their positions to the preferences of voters. However, 
their efforts are constrained by the policy commitments of self-selected activists and leaders, 
by brand reputations embedded in the expectations of voters, and by the interests and values 
of their social base.  
Hence, the dynamics of long-term and short-term change appear to be different. Up 
close, one can detect almost continuous adjustment by political parties to the preferences of 
voters. Over longer reaches of time, they appear to be moving in quicksand. The crises reveal 
this starkly, and provoke a theoretical challenge: how can one put short-term strategic 
response and long-term cleavage constraints on the same page? 
Cleavage theory implies that party system change is discontinuous. It is characterized by 
periods of relative stability as political parties jostle to gain support and by periods of abrupt 
change when new political parties rise up in response to a critical juncture. The evidence 
presented here suggests that the crises of the past decade may be such a critical juncture for 
Europe. In a Downsian model of issue competition, one would expect existing political parties 
to respond to voter preferences by supplying appropriate policies. However, as cleavage theory 
predicts, the positional flexibility of political parties is heavily constrained. Change has come not 
because mainstream parties have shifted in response to voter preferences, but because voters 
have turned to parties with distinctive profiles on the new cleavage. These parties raise issues 
related to Europe and immigration that mainstream parties would rather ignore. Radical TAN 
parties set the frame of competition on these transnational issues, and green parties take 
diametrically opposite positions. Both parties give these issues much greater salience in their 
appeals to voters than mainstream parties, and they are less handicapped by internal divisions. 
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 The result, according to cleavage theory is not realignment, but accretion. The shaping 
power of prior cleavages diminishes over time, but few die completely. The territorial cleavage, 
the religious cleavage, and the class cleavage have each lost bite, but none has been 
extinguished. Cleavage theory conceives layers of partisan attachment rather than the 
replacement of one dimension of contestation by another. The party system of a country 
reflects its history of prior struggles as well as its current divides.  
 Because the expression of a cleavage depends on the institutionalization of prior 
conflicts, a uniform response to a new cleavage is unusual. The one exception in Lipset and 
Rokkan’s account is the class cleavage, rooted in the industrial revolution, which produced 
major socialist parties across the board.14 The transnational cleavage has had distinctly 
different expressions across Europe. This reflects the contrasting effects and differential timing 
of the economic and migration crisis in the different regions of Europe which play out in the 
context of prior cleavages. The outcome, in broad terms, is that the South has seen radical left 
parties mobilize on the class divide. In most former communist countries, by contrast, the 
radical right has catalyzed the transnational cleavage and the radical left is weak or absent. 
Most Central and Northern countries have seen radical right parties mobilize on the 
transnational cleavage, with green parties at the opposite pole and radical left parties pressing 
distributional issues.15 
                                                          
14 Though not in the United States for reasons explored in Lipset and Marks (2000). 
15 These general patterns require refinement in comparative national and subnational analysis. 
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 Lipset and Rokkan would not be surprised to find that a period of transformative 
transnationalism has given rise to an intense political reaction. Viewed from the present, the 
cleavage structure of Europe begins with one sweeping jurisdictional reform, the rise of the 
national state, and finishes with another, the internationalization of economic exchange, 
migration, and political authority. The cleavage arising from national state formation is still very 
much in evidence in minority communities that continue to resist national assimilation (Hooghe 
and Marks 2016). The cleavage arising from transnationalism may also endure. It is grounded in 
educational opportunities that have persistent effects over a person’s life and which are 
conveyed to offspring. However, the functional pressures that have given rise to 
transnationalism are perhaps even more durable. Transnational exchange and supranational 
governance reflect the benefits of scale in human affairs. Even if the EU were to fail, 
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Table 1. Change in Party Positioning on Immigration and European Integration, 2006 to 2014 
 
Change over three waves Absolute change Directional change 
 Immigration European integration Immigration European integration 
Mean value 0.59 0.55 -0.02 0.05 
Median value 0.49 0.35 0.05 0.07 
Min; max change 0; 2.30 0; 2.79 -2.30; +1.80 -2.79; +2.41 
# parties moving  +/-2 points 3 6 3 more restrictive  3 more oppositional, 3 more supportive 
Standard Deviation 0.50 0.53 0.78 0.76 
Number of parties 140 143 140 143 
Source: Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al. 2015). European integration is scaled from strongly opposed (1) to strongly in favor (7). For 





Figure 1a: Salience of European Integration     Figure 1b: Salience of Immigration  
















Note: salience is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘no    Note: salience is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from ‘not 
importance at all’ (0) to ‘of great importance’ (10). The continuous line is the  important at all’ (0) to ‘extremely important’ (10). N= 157. 
fit line for 2014 (N=208); the dashed line is the fit line for 2006 (N=158).   Source: 2010 data from the CHES trend file. 
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Note: change in support for European integration on a seven-point scale from 1 (strongly opposed) to 7 
(strongly in favor) over two waves (N=566); three waves (N=388); four waves (N=230); and five waves 
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Figure 3: Dissent on European Integration  
 
Note: N=208 political parties. Dissent is estimated on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (party was 
completely united) to 10 (party was extremely divided) in response to ‘What about conflict or dissent 
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Note: vote totals for green/radical right and radical left party families in the national election prior to 


























































Online Appendix  
Table A.1: Party position, dissent, and salience on European integration and immigration 
Position on European 
integration 
‘How would you describe the general position on European integration that 
the party’s leadership took over the course of [year]?’ On a seven-point 
scale: 
1=strongly opposed  
2=opposed  
3=somewhat opposed  
4= neutral  
5=somewhat in favor  
6=in favor  
7= strongly in favor  
[Don’t know] 
Salience of European 
integration 
‘We would like you to think about the salience of European integration for a 
party. Over the course of [year], how important was the EU to the parties in 
their public stance?’ On an eleven-point scale: 
0=no importance, never mentioned 
10=great importance, the most important issue 
Dissent on European 
integration 
‘What about conflict or dissent within parties over European integration over 
the course of [year]?’ On an eleven-point scale: 
0=Party was completely united 




‘Position on immigration policy’. Eleven-point scale: 
0=fully opposed to a restrictive policy on immigration 
10=fully in favor of a restrictive policy on immigration 
[Don’t know] 




‘Importance/salience of immigration policy for each of the following parties’. 
On an eleven-point scale: 
0=not important at all 
10=extremely important 
[Don’t know] 
Source: Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, which combines five waves (1999, 2002, 2006, 2010, 2014) 
for 14 Northwestern and Southern EU member states and four waves (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014) for 10 
Central and East European countries. Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta are not included. Estimates are 
average placements by party experts, aggregated by party and country. For a discussion of the reliability 







Table A.2: Categorizations by geographical region, party family, time point 
Region North = Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK;  
South = Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain;  




‘Mainstream parties’ are political parties that Lipset and Rokkan recognized in the major 
party families that expressed the historical religious or class cleavage, i.e., the Christian 
democratic, social democratic, liberal, and conservative party families. We categorize a 
political party as mainstream if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the European 
People's Party (EPP), the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats for Europe (ALDE), or the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), or if 
not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, it is affiliated with a 
corresponding mainstream pan-European political party: European People's Party (EPP), 
the Party of European Socialists (PES), the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe 
(ALDE), the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR), the European 
Democratic Party (EDP), European Christian Political Movement (ECPM).  
‘New cleavage parties’ are political parties that identify with the Green or radical right 
party family.  
We categorize a party as green if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the 
Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), or if not represented in the current or 
previous European Parliament, it is affiliated with the European Green Party (EGP). We 
exclude regionalist political parties in the European Free Alliance (EFA). 
We categorize a party as radical right if it is a member (or applied to be a member) of the 
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD/EFD), or Europe of Nations and 
Freedom (ENL), or if not represented in the current or previous European Parliament, it is 
affiliated with a corresponding pan-European political party: the Alliance for Direct 
Democracy in Europe (ADDE), the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), the European 
Alliance for Freedom (EAF), the Alliance of European National Movements (AENM), the 
EUDemocrats (EUD), Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD), or the 
Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF/MELD).  
‘Radical left’ parties are those that are member (or applied to be member) of the 
European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) in the European parliament, or if not 
represented in the current or previous European Parliament, affiliated with the Nordic 
Green Left Alliance (NGLA), the Party of the European Left (PEL), the European Anti-








(Figure 4) Vote totals for green, radical right, and radical Left parties in the national 
election prior to January 2017. In the three countries that had not yet conducted a second 
national election since the crisis we substitute vote totals by vote shares projected by three 
or more opinion polls from Summer-Fall 2016. The vote percentages are for the elections 
(or poll average) in Belgium (2014), Denmark (2015), Germany (2013), Greece (2015), 
Spain (2016), France (2012), Ireland (2016), Italy (poll average), the Netherlands (2012), 
UK (2015), Portugal (2015), Austria (poll average), Finland (2015), Sweden (2014), 
Bulgaria (2014), Czech Republic (2013), Estonia (2015), Hungary (2014), Latvia (2014), 




A. 3:  Change in party positioning on European integration reported by voters (EES) and experts 
(CHES) 
The European Election Survey (EES) asks voters to place political parties on European integration, and the 
CHES expert survey asks experts to place political parties on European integration. By comparing compare 
wave-to-wave party shifts calculated by Adams et al. (2016) for eight countries in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 
EES surveys with wave-to-wave party shifts in the 1999-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010 CHES expert 
surveys, it is possible to compare how voters and experts view change in party positioning. Across 
consecutive waves, the mean absolute change in party position on European integration is 0.52 on a 10-
point scale compared to 0.59 for CHES, converted to the same scale. So on average, voters and experts 
perceive about the same amount of change in party positioning. 
 
 Voters (Adams et al.) Experts (own calculations) 
mean 0.14 0.10 
absolute mean 0.52 0.59 
minimum; maximum -1.35; 1.41 -1.48; 2.71 
 
Adams et al. (2016) conclude that citizens’ perceptions of party shift track experts’ perceptions, albeit with a 









































Austria Polls GRUNE Austrian Green Party 1304 12.0 1.7 2.8 6.5 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Belgium 2014 ECOLO Ecolo 104 3.3 1.2 2.2 6.3 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Belgium 2014 Groen! Groen! 105 5.3 1.2 2.0 6.2 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Czech R. 2013 SZ Green Party 2107 3.2 1.3 3.7 6.6 no MEP EGP 
Denmark 2015 SF Socialist People’s Party 206 4.2 3.1 2.3 4.6 EFA EGP 
Estonia 2015 EER Estonian Greens 2207 0.9 4.3 6.0 6.0 no MEP EGP 
Finland 2015 VIHR Green League 1408 8.5 0.8 4.4 5.9 Greens/ EFA EGP 
France 2012 VERTS Green Party 605 5.5 1.4 3.3 6.2 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Germany 2013 Grüne German Greens 304 8.4 2.2 3.5 6.2 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Hungary 2014 LMP Politics can be Different 2309 5.3 2.9 3.6 5.3 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Hungary 2014 E14 Together 2014 2310 2.1 2.4 4.9 6.6 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Ireland 2016 GP Green Party 705 2.7 2.6 3.8 4.4 no MEP EGP 
Lithuania 2016 LZP Lithuanian Green Party 2521 2.0 NA NA NA no MEP EGP 
Netherlands 2012 GL Green-Left 1005 2.3 1.0 2.7 6.5 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Romania Polls USR Union for the Salvation of 
Romania 
2713 9.1 NA NA NA no MEP EGP 
Spain 2016 ICV Initiative for Catalonia 518 1.3 0.9 2.0 4.8 Greens/ EFA EGP 
Sweden 2014 MP 
Environment Party-The 
Greens 1607 6.9 1.6 3.5 4.4 Greens/ EFA EGP 
UK 2015 GREEN Green Party 1107 3.8 1.0 2.0 5.2 Greens/ EFA EGP 







































Austria Polls FPO Freedom Party 1303 34.0 8.8 5.5 1.9 ENF MENL 
Belgium 2014 VB Vlaams Belang 112 3.7 9.0 5.5 2.6 ENF MENF 
Belgium 2014 PP People’s Party 120 1.5 7.5 8.5 2.5 no MEP ADDE 
Bulgaria 2014 VMRO-BND Bulgarian National 
Movement 
2005 3.1 8.6 3.7 3.3 ECR none 
Bulgaria 2014 ATAKA National Union Attak 2007 4.5 9.6 1.4 1.5 no MEP none 
Bulgaria 2014 NFSB 
National Front for the 
Salvation of Bulgaria 2014 4.2 8.0 4.3 3.0 EFD MELD 
Czech R. 2013 USVIT Dawn of Direct Democracy 2112 6.9 7.7 5.3 2.3 ENF MENF 
Denmark 2015 DF Danish People’s Party 215 21.1 8.4 4.5 1.9 EFD/ECR MELD 
Estonia 2015 EKRE 
Conservative People’s 
Party of Estonia  
-- 8.1 -- -- -- 
cooperates with 
Baltic rad right 
-- 
Finland 2015 PS True Finns 1405 17.7 9.1 4.1 1.6 EFD/ECR ACRE 
France 2012 FN National Front 610 13.6 8.9 5.9 1.2 ENF MENF 
France 2012 MPF Movement for France 612 0.2 8.9 8.0 1.2 EFD MELD 
Germany 2013 NPD 
National Democratic Party 
for Germany 
309 1.3 9.8 5.3 1.7 non-inscrit APF 
Germany 2013 AfD Alternative for Germany 310 4.7 8.7 8.3 1.6 EFD, ENF none 
Greece 2015 LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally 410 0.0 8.3 5.3 3.3 no MEP MELD 
Greece 2015 ANEL Independent Greeks 412 3.7 8.6 5.1 2.2 no MEP none 
Greece 2015 XA Golden Dawn 415 7.0 10 2.9 1.1 non-inscrit APF 
Hungary 2014 JOBBIK 
Movement for a Better 
Hungary 
2308 20.2 9.5 4.0 1.2 non-inscrit AENM 
Italy Polls LN Northern League 811 13.3 9.1 7.3 1.1 ENF MENF 
Italy Polls Fdl Brothers of Italy 844 3.3 9.3 5.6 2.2 
AN successor, 
cooperates with FN none 
Latvia 2014 NA National Alliance 2406 16.6 8.1 5.9 5.7 ENF/ ECR ACRE 




Netherlands 2012 PVV Freedom Party 1017 10.1 7.8 4.6 1.1 ENF EAF 
Poland 2015 PiS Law and Order 2605 37.6 8.5 3.1 3.8 ENF/ ECR ACRE 
Poland 2015 KNP Congress of the New Right 2614 4.8 8.8 9.6 1.1 ENF none 
Poland 2015 SP United Poland 2616 NA 8.6 3.4 3.0 EFD MELD 
Poland 2015 KUKIZ15 Kukiz’ 15 2617 8.8 NA NA NA no MEP none 
Slovakia 2016 SNS Slovak National Party 2809 16.7 9.4 4.8 2.3 EFD MELD 
Slovenia 2014 SNS Slovenian National Party 2907 2.2 8.5 6.0 3.0 no MEP none 
Sweden 2014 SD Swedish Democrats 1610 12.9 9.2 5.4 1.3 EFDD ADDE 
UK 2015 UKIP UK Independence Party 1108 12.7 9.3 8.6 1.1 EFD ADDE 
Legend: ECR = European Conservatives and Reformers; ENF = Europe of Nations and Freedom; EFD = Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy; ACRE = 
Alliance of Conservatives and Reformists in Europe; UEN = Union for Europe of the Nations; ADDE = Alliance for Direct Democracy in Europe; AENM = Alliance 
of European National Movements; APF = Alliance for Peace and Freedom; EAF = European Alliance for Freedom; MELD = Movement for a Europe of Liberties 
and Democracy; MENF = Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom. 
 




































Belgium 2014 PVDA Workers Party of Belgium 119 3.7 2.8 0.2 3.4 no MEP IMCWP 
Czech R. 2013 KSCM 
Communist Party of 
Bohemia & Moravia 
2103 14.9 6.6 1.0 2.7 GUE PEL/ IMCWP 
Denmark 2015 EL Unity List-Red/Green 
Alliance 
213 7.8 2.1 1.0 1.8 no MEP PEL/EACL 
Finland 2015 VAS Left Alliance 1404 7.1 1.9 1.7 4.3 GUE NGLA/PEL 
France 2012 PCF Communist Party 601 4.8 3.9 1.2 2.6 GUE PEL 
France 2012 PRG Left Radical Party 603 1.7 3.4 3.8 5.8 GUE PEL 
France 2012 PG Left Party 624 0.7 2.4 1.1 2.1 GUE PEL 
Germany 2013 LINKE The Left 306 8.6 4.9 1.3 3.0 GUE PEL 
Germany 2013 DieTier 
Human Environment Animal 
Protection 312 0.3 4.0 2.0 4 GUE Euro Animal 




Greece 2015 KKE Communist Party 404 5.6 5.8 0.1 1.1 non-inscrit ICMWP 
Ireland 2016 SF We Ourselves 707 13.8 5.1 1.9 2.8 GUE none 
Ireland 2016 SP Socialist Party 708 2.9 1.9 0.5 2.2 GUE EACL/ ICMWP 
Ireland 2016 PBPA People Before Profit Alliance 709 1.0 1.2 0.4 2.3 no MEP EACL 
Italy Polls RC Communist Refoundation 803 NA 1.0 0.1 2.0 GUE PEL 
Italy Polls SEL Left Ecology Freedom 838 3.7 0.3 0.7 3.1 GUE none 
Italy Polls M5S Five Star Movement 845 27.9 2.6 3.4 1.4 EFD none 
Netherlands 2012 SP Socialist Party 1014 9.7 4.1 1.0 2.1 GUE none 
Netherlands 2012 PvdD Party of the Animals 1018 1.9 2.3 2.4 3.7 GUE NGLA 
Portugal 2015 CDU 
Democratic Unitarian 
Coalition 
1201 8.3 4.2 0.3 1.9 GUE none 
Portugal 2015 BE Left Bloc 1208 10.2 0.7 0.7 3.1 GUE PEL 
Slovenia 2014 ZL United Left 2912 6.0 1.3 0.7 3.7 no MEP PEL 
Spain 2016 IU United Left 504 NA 1.4 1.8 4.6 GUE PEL 
Spain 2016 EH Bildu Basque Country Unite 524 0.4 2.1 1.1 4.7 GUE none 
Spain 2016 Podemos We Can 525 21.2 1.8 1.3 4.4 GUE none 
Sweden 2014 V Left Party 1601 5.7 2.0 1.4 2.1 GUE NGLA 
Legend: EACL = European Anti-Capitalist Left; GUE = European United Left/Nordic Green Left; NGLA = Nordic Green Left Alliance (NGLA); PEL= Party of the 
European Left; IMCWP = International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties. 
 
 
